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Why has the expansion of women￿ s economic and political rights coincided with economic
development? This paper investigates this question, focusing on a key economic right for
women: property rights. The basic hypothesis is that the process of development (i.e., capital
accumulation and declining fertility) exacerbated the tension in men￿ s con￿ icting interests as
husbands versus fathers, ultimately resolving them in favor of the latter. As husbands, men
stood to gain from their privileged position in a patriarchal world whereas, as fathers, they were
hurt by a system that a⁄orded few rights to their daughters. The model predicts that declining
fertility would hasten reform of women￿ s property rights whereas legal systems that were
initially more favorable to women would delay them. The theoretical relationship between
capital and the relative attractiveness of reform is non-monotonic but growth inevitably leads
to reform. I explore the empirical validity of the theoretical predictions by using cross-state
variation in the US in the timing of married women obtaining property and earning rights
between 1850 and 1920.
￿I wish to thank Matthias Doepke, Lena Edlund, Shelly Lundberg, and Matt Wiswall
for many helpful suggestions. I thank Eduardo Zilberman for providing excellent research
assistance.1 Introduction
The last two hundred years have witnessed a substantial, historically unprecedented, expansion
of women￿ s rights, both economic and political. In almost all industrialized countries, women
went from being the property of their husbands and/or their fathers, with very few legal rights,
to possessing the same political rights and most of the same economic rights as men.1 Why
did this process occur? And, in particular, why is the spread of women￿ s rights across the
globe appear to be correlated with economic development?2
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between women￿ s rights and
development by focussing on a fundamental economic right: property rights. Property rights
include ￿the legal rights to acquire, own, sell and transfer property, collect and keep rents,
keep one￿ s wages, make contracts, bring lawsuits, and, if seeking divorce, maintain some of the
marriage assets and keep control and guardianship of the children.￿ 3 These are rights that
married women did not exercise in full neither in Europe nor in the US until the legal system
was reformed over a long period of time. Under most legal systems (e.g. the those based
on Roman civil law, which in￿ uenced most of continental Europe, or those based on English
common law, like the majority of US colonies), women who married lost, if not ownership
then, at a minimum, control over their physical (inanimate) property and, upon divorce, lost
guardianship over their children as well.
Why did married women eventually obtain property rights in the US and in Europe?4 Why
did men lose some of the advantages of their privileged status? It is di¢ cult to ￿nd a rigorous
argument for this in the historical literature.5 This paper examines the hypothesis that, over
time, economic development ￿by which I mean primarily a process of capital accumulation
and declining fertility ￿altered male interests regarding women￿ s rights. That is, although
men in general bene￿tted from a patriarchal society in which women enjoyed few economic
and political rights, they also su⁄ered from the welfare consequences of such a system for their
daughters. My hypothesis is that, at a su¢ ciently high level of wealth and/or at a su¢ ciently
low level of fertility, a man￿ s con￿ icting interests in his role as a husband relative to those in
his capacity as a father were resolved in favor of the latter. This argument is examined in
a dynamic model and its implications are studied empirically by using variation across US
states in the timing of married women￿ s property acts.
The theoretical argument is developed in the context of a OLG economy with endogenous
1This process is far from complete globally as is clear from various indices of gender equality (see.e.g.
the The Global Gender Gap Report 2007). See Du￿ o (2005) for a review of the literature on gender and
development.
2Indices that measure women￿ s (lack of) rights in areas as diverse as access to land, access to bank loans,
violence against women, abortion policy, etc., show a robust negative correlation across countries with GDP
per capita. See Doepke and Tertilt (2009).
3See http://www.womeninworldhistory.com.
4Women today do not enjoy full property rights in several parts of the world, both de jure and de facto.
5A variety of arguments are given (see the literature review that follows below), but there are no comparative
studies, to my knowledge, that try to make the case for the importance of some factors over others.
1growth in which parents care about their own utility from consumption and the average welfare
of their children. In this economy, individuals marry and have children. They then produce,
consume, and bequeath capital to (or invest in) their children. Under a patriarchal system
in which married women have no property rights (also denoted the "no rights" regime), the
allocation decisions are made entirely by the husband and he obtains, loosely speaking, all
the surplus from the marriage. In an economy where women have the same property rights
as men (also known at the "equal property rights" regime), the allocation weighs the welfare
of both spouses equally.
The theory yields three central predictions. First, it predicts that growth will eventually
lead men to prefer the equal rights regime over the patriarchal one. Male preferences over the
two regimes will not be, however, a monotonic function of wealth (or capital stock). Starting
at a low level of wealth, greater wealth ￿rst increases the relative attractiveness of the no
rights regime. Once wealth is above some critical threshold, further increases will decrease
the attractiveness of the patriarchal system. Second, the theory predicts that lower fertility
will lead to earlier regime change. Thus, ceteris paribus, states with lower fertility should
reform their property regime sooner. Third, it predicts that states with legal regimes that are
initially more favorable to married women, perhaps surprisingly, should see property rights
reform happen later.
The main intuition delivered by the model relies on the asymmetric e⁄ect that growing
wealth or falling fertility has on the welfare of sons versus daughters. Under the patriarchal
regime, both factors improve the welfare of sons more than the welfare of daughters. In
particular, falling fertility enables a father to increase his son￿ s welfare by bequeathing more
to him. His ability to increase the welfare of his daughter via greater bequests, on the other
hand, is more limited since the surplus from marriage is captured primarily by his son-in-law.
As fertility decreases, the disparity in welfare enjoyed by sons versus daughters increases,
exacerbating the welfare cost of the patriarchal regime relative to a system of equal property
rights. At some critical level of fertility, a father is made better o⁄sacri￿cing the consumption
bene￿ts he obtains from being sel￿sh with his wife in order to ensure that his sons-in-laws
are forced to be generous towards his daughters. The intuition for why growth eventually
leads to regime change is similar except that it is complicated by the ￿nding that the relative
bene￿t of the two regimes is not a monotonic function of wealth.
The empirical investigation uses variation across US states in the timing of property rights
reform and other key variables. Beginning in the 1840s, US states and territories reformed
the laws governing married women￿ s ownership and control of (real and personal) property
and earnings. I use Geddes and Lueck￿ s (2002) dating for when a property act gave women
management and control of their separate estate and similarly for earnings. This was a
relatively lengthy process beginning with Massachusetts in 1846 and (for the purposes of this
analysis) ending with all but four out of 48 states having granted these rights by 1920.
I show that two key predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical relations
found in the data. In particular, I construct a measure of survival-fertility which considers
only children above the age of ten and thus guarantees that these would have a very high
chance of surviving to the age of marriage ￿as these are the individuals that concerns the
theory. I show that, ceteris paribus, states with lower levels of survival-fertility tended to
2reform earlier. Since survival-fertility is an endogenous variable, I also instrument it with
child mortality. Ceteris paribus, states with higher child mortality tended to have lower
levels of survival-fertility The results are robust to the use of this instrument. In addition, as
implied by the theory, I ￿nd that states with a legal system that was relatively more favorable
to women (those with a system of community law which decrees that property acquired during
marriage and the pro￿ts derived from it are jointly owned by both spouses) tended to reform
their property laws later. The e⁄ect of per-capita wealth, on the other hand, is almost always
insigni￿cant and close to zero.6 All the results are robust to year and state (or regional) ￿xed
e⁄ects.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature review of the main
work in this area followed by some historical background on married women￿ s property rights
in the US in the 1800s. Section 3 presents the model, derives the main theoretical results,
and discusses the roles of the various assumptions and extensions of the model. Section 4
examines the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between women￿ s property laws
between 1850-1920 in the US and state levels of per-capita wealth, survival-fertility, and
di⁄erent legal systems using a variety of estimation methods. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature and History
In this section I present a review of the literature in this area and a brief historical overview
of married women￿ s property rights.
2.1 Literature Review
There is a growing literature that investigates why rights were extended to various segments
of society. The general idea that an elite may give up some of its privileges to improve its own
welfare can be found in several contexts. The literature on franchise extension (see the review
by Przeworski (2006)) mostly argues that su⁄rage rights were conceded because it became in
the self-interest of those in power for a variety of reasons unrelated to the one developed in
this paper (see, e.g., Justman and Gradstein (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and
Oxoby (2005), or Ticchi and Vindigni (2006)), although there are also papers that focus on the
threats of revolution or violence (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) or Jack and Laguno⁄
(2003)). For the interesting case of women￿ s su⁄rage, a recent paper by Bertocchi (2008)
develops the hypothesis that men granted women the vote once industrialization and the
ensuing narrower gender wage-gap rendered gender preferences over taxation more similar.7
Whether slavery was abolished because it was ine¢ cient and thus no longer in the interests of
land-owners has also been debated (see, e.g. Fogel and Engerman (1974) or Wright (2006)).
Other rights, such as education or the prohibition of child labor, have also been studied.
Galor and Moav (2006), for example, develop the thesis that educational reform (universal
public education) was in the interest of both capitalists and workers and Doepke and Zilibotti
6In the section on discussion and extensions, a potential explanation for this is suggested.
7See, e.g., Edlund and Pande (2002) for evidence on the existence of a gender gap in voting behavior.
3(2005) argue that child labor laws (forbidding the latter from working) were in the interest of
working families.
The two papers that have investigated why women obtained economic rights ￿Geddes and
Lueck (2002) and Doepke and Tertilt (2009) ￿also start from the premise that men granted
women economic rights because it was in the former￿ s self interest. Geddes￿and Lueck￿ s
theoretical reasoning is essentially the same as the economic argument made for the abolition
of slavery: they argue that married women￿ s inability to own and control property (including
earnings) produced suboptimal e⁄ort on their part and that this ine¢ ciency increased with
greater capital. The fact that white married women in the US during the second half of the
1800s did not work outside the home makes this argument less persuasive, however.8 The
main contribution of their paper, however, lies in its use of variation in the timing of when
US states granted married women the right to own and control separate estates and earnings
to examine the implications of their theory. They ￿nd a robust positive relationship between
per-capita wealth and a state￿ s reform of its property rights laws. Their paper, and an earlier
study by Kahn (1996) that investigated the e⁄ect of these reforms on women￿ s patenting
activity, deserve credit for making use of this variation to study the causes and consequences
of these fundamental reforms. The empirical portion of my paper build on these important
contributions.
Doepke and Tertilt (2009) present a very interesting theoretical analysis regarding women￿ s
economic rights that relies on two key ingredients: ine¢ cient investment in children and
gender di⁄erences in preferences. They assume that the marriage market matches people
purely at random and that children are public goods. This necessarily leads to ine¢ ciently
low investment in children (in their case, in the form of human capital), as there is no "price"
mechanism (i.e. no competition) that allows the marriage market to internalize the utility of
the child￿ s future spouse from higher investment. This is a standard result in the marriage
literature. The twist comes from the assumption that women discount the welfare of their
children less than men. This implies that if the return to time spent educating children is
su¢ ciently high, men will be made better o⁄allowing women to have a greater say in deciding
a child￿ s level of education as this goes some way towards remedying the ine¢ ciency. The
authors interpret this result as increasing the incentives that men had to grant women greater
economic rights as this presumably would increase the latter￿ s bargaining power and thus their
ability to in￿ uence household decisions. A possible objection, however, is that if this were
the main reason to extend rights, it would have been easier and more advantageous for men
to simply mandate a higher level of education for all (i.e., compulsory schooling, which in fact
also happened over this time period).9
The argument developed in my paper does not require ine¢ ciencies arising either from pro-
duction or from the marriage market nor rely on exogenous gender di⁄erences in preferences,
which is not to say that these factors did not play a role in the extension of women￿ s rights.
8As calculated in FernÆndez (2008), for example, in 1880 the labor force participation of white married
women in the US between the ages of 30-40 was below 3% and rose very slowly over the following 4-5 decades.
See also Goldin (1990).
9The authors are aware of this and develop an extension of their model in which parents and schools are
complements in the production of human capital. In this extension, an increase in the return to human capital
can make increasing both inputs more attractive.
4Instead, it rests upon fathers caring about their daughters￿welfare and their inability to make
the latter better o⁄except indirectly (by bequeathing more and thus increasing the welfare of
their grandchildren, i.e., their daughters￿children). It is reassuring, therefore, for the mecha-
nism proposed by this paper that there exists recent evidence showing that daughters appear
to in￿ uence fathers￿legal and political preferences.10 In particular, two interesting recent
papers (Washington (2008) and Oswald and Podthavee (2006)) show that voting preferences
and behavior are in￿ uenced by the proportion of one￿ s children that are girls.
Washington (2008) uses voting records from the US Congress in 1997-98 and ￿nds that,
conditional on the total number of children, a US Congressional Representative is more likely
to vote liberally on women￿ s issues the greater the proportion of female children. Oswald and
Podthavee (2006) use the British Household Panel Study data to examine preferences towards
political parties in the UK. They ￿nd that, for a constant family size, parents with more girls
have more "left" wing preferences (i.e., are more likely to identify with voting for either the
Labor or Liberal Party). In the model presented here, it will also be the case that a father
with more daughters would, ceteris paribus, show a greater preference for women￿ s rights.11
2.2 Married Women￿ s Property Laws in 19th century US
The British colonies based their laws on English common law which, as summarized in the
Blackstone Commentaries, stated:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-a
feme-covert.12
Under nineteenth century common law, a married woman was bound by the rules of
coverture which, as seen above, vested her legal rights in her husband. Upon marriage, a
woman￿ s personal possessions became her husband￿ s and he could dispose of them in any
way he wished during his lifetime or in his will. He was, in general, also entitled to all the
personal property his wife might acquire during the marriage. Although her real property
remained under her ownership, the pro￿ts from these went to the husband. Furthermore, the
husband had the right to manage her land. Thus, a husband controlled his wife￿ s property
and earnings (whether from labor or from land). Furthermore, married women were not
permitted to enter into contracts without the consent of their husbands nor allowed to engage
in trade on their own account as ￿sole traders￿ . Even children were allocated to their father
in the (rare) case of divorce. After 1830, US states began to pass legislation that revised
these restrictions. Between then and 1920 there was a large increase in women￿ s rights.13
10See also Lundberg (2005) for an excellent review of the literature on sons, daughters, and parental pref-
erences.
11See the extension to a stochastic number of female relative to male children in Section 3.5.
12From Blackstone (1765-69), Book 1, Chap. 15., p. 431.
13See Doepke and Tertilt (2009) for a review of the expansion of some of these rights in the US and England.
5Some of the initial revisions of the law of coverture were in response to the Panic of 1837 and
the ensuing depression, particularly in the South.14 These laws mainly attempted to shield
a married woman￿ s property (including slaves) from her husband￿ s creditors. This factor
does not explain why the laws evolved over time to allow women to own and control separate
property, to write contracts, to own and control their earnings, or to maintain custody over
their children. The excellent legal studies literature in this ￿eld (e.g., Basch (1982), Chused
(1983,1985), Salmon (1986), Shammas (2002), and Warbasse (1987)) discusses multiple causes
that range from the desire for codi￿cation, the growing awareness of the similarity in legal
position of slaves and married women, the greater status of women arising from their growing
responsibilities in the domestic sphere, the growing feminist movement, and paternalism.
While these may have all played a role, an important question is why did they become critical
in the mid to late 1800s rather than earlier or later?
Paternalism is the reason given for reform in this paper in the sense that men caring about
their daughters￿welfare is the key factor that, in combination with economic development,
gives rise to women being granted property rights.15 In light of this, it is interesting to note
that in the popular rhetoric of this period, paternalism appears repeatedly. Legislators, for
example, would raise the ￿specter of drunken husbands￿to gain passage of married women￿ s
property acts. In Warbasse￿ s (1987) discussion of New York￿ s experience, she concludes:
￿Final passage became assured only when conservatives, convinced that a married women￿ s
property acts held de￿nite bene￿ts for their own wives and daughters, dropped their talk of
separate interests and family disharmony.￿ 16 The contribution of this paper is to provide an
explanation for why paternal concern for a daughter￿ s welfare, presumably always present,
￿nally overcame the bene￿ts associated with man￿ s privileged status in a patriarchal system.
As will be shown, a process of capital accumulation and declining fertility eventually realigned
a man￿ s interests to favor his daughter.
3 The Model
Below I present a simple dynamic model and use it to study how growth, fertility, and legal
regimes that are relatively more favorable to women a⁄ect male preferences towards a patri-
archal system relative to one in which women have equal property rights. I do not model the
intricate legal system that governed the ability to bequeath, the inheritance rights in the case
of a spouse￿ s death (dower and curtesy), the di⁄erences between the treatment of real and
personal property, or the consequences of divorce. Instead, I simplify matters by assuming
that the issue is one of control over the allocation of the income derived from capital, whether
it is for consumption or for bequests. While this is a considerable abstraction, it hopefully
serves to clarify some of the basic implications of the two property systems.
14Mississippi was the ￿rst state to pass a married women￿ s property act in 1839.
15Furthermore, as will be made clear in section 3.5, the type of paternalism required by the theory is
straightforward. In particular, fathers need not care about their grandchildren via their daughter￿ s utility
function as in Doepke and Tertilt (2009) ￿it is su¢ cient that they care about their daughter￿ s utility from
consumption.
16Warbasse (1987, p. 229).
63.1 The Basic Framework
The economy consists of married households composed of a man (the husband h), a woman
(the wife w), and their 2n children (consisting of n boys and n girls). Throughout the
analysis I will keep fertility exogenous and examine how changes in its level a⁄ect the relative
attractiveness of the two regimes.17
Individuals have log preferences over the consumption good c and also care about the
average welfare of their children. Maximization of a concave utility function implies that
all sons will obtain the same utility, U0
h; similarly, all daughters will obtain the same utility,
U0
w. The welfare of daughters relative to sons, however, will depend on the property rights
regime. Note that a prime 0 is used to denote variables for the next generation and thus that
Uh, for example, is the husband￿ s utility whereas U0
h is the utility of his son (himself a future
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for i = h;w:
Households start out with some inherited capital or property k (these terms will be used
interchangeably) which is used to produce output of a single good. The production is assumed
to be Ak;A > 1. The output is then allocated between consumption of the husband, ch, the
wife, cw, and inheritances k0
i; i = h;w, for each boy (h) or girl (w) child. Once bequests are
allocated, sons and daughters enter the marriage market and ￿nd a spouse.
How the household-allocation decision is made depends upon the regime. Under a pa-
triarchal regime in which women have no property rights (also denoted NR for "no rights"),
all the decision power is assumed to rest with the husband. Under the equal property rights
regime (also denoted ER for "equal rights"), on the other hand, women and men jointly own
and control marital property. To simplify matters, rather than explicitly introduce household
bargaining in the model, I assume that the ￿nal allocation maximizes the equally weighted
sum of the two spouses￿utilities. A discussion of this is postponed to the relevant section.
The Marriage Market
Before proceeding to derive the equilibrium allocations under each regime, it is important
to specify how spousal matches are formed and what kind of contracts individuals can write.
As in most of the literature on marriage we make the (realistic in this historical context)
assumption that parents cannot make match-speci￿c bequests, i.e., that parents are unable
to write contracts specifying bequests contingent on the amount of capital that the future
spouse inherits. This is captured in the timing since bequests precede marriage. Thus, all
investments in children are ex-ante.
Will investment in children be e¢ cient? This depends on the speci￿c assumption made
about the marriage market. One extreme assumption is to assume random matching. This
17This assumption makes the model analytically tractable but should not otherwise a⁄ect the conclusions.
In particular, in a model with endogenous fertility one could still examine the consequence of factors that
change desired fertility (e.g., by changing an exogenous component of the cost associated with it such as
urbanization).
7assumption guarantees ine¢ ciently low investment in children as there is no mechanism that
forces parents to internalize the future spouse￿ s welfare from investment in their child. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, if marriage is modeled as a process of costless search in
a large market (as in Peters and Siow (2002) or Iyigun and Walsh (2007a)), there always
exists an e¢ cient equilibrium. In particular, perfect competition for spouses implies that
the externalities associated with investment in a child are internalized by the return to this
investment (in terms of a spouse￿ s characteristics) in the marriage market.
I will assume throughout that the marriage market is perfectly competitive and solve for
the e¢ cient equilibrium. This clari￿es the mechanism driving the results in the paper by
not introducing another source of ine¢ ciency and simpli￿es the algebra. It is worth noting,
however, that the exact matching environment is not critical; the results go through with
random matching as well. I will also assume throughout that consumption is not contractable
which seems a reasonable assumption given the di¢ culty in monitoring this activity. Thus,
children receive bequests and then obtain a spouse in a large competitive marriage market
knowing that allocation decisions will be made according to property rights regime that is in
place.
An equilibrium in the marriage market consists of assignment of men to women (or vice
versa) including the null assignment which we denote as single (i.e. a woman is not assigned
to a man or vice versa) such that there does not exist either a pair of individuals nor a single
individual that can, by breaking their current assignments (including being single), make
themselves better o⁄ with at least one of them strictly better o⁄.
We next turn to deriving the equilibrium under each regime. I restrict attention to
symmetric equilibria, i.e., ones in which all parents follow the same strategies.
3.2 Equilibrium Under No Property Rights (NR)
A household begins its married life with an endowment of (inherited) capital for the husband
kh and an endowment for his wife, e kh, where ~ ki denotes the capital brought to the household by
i￿ s spouse, i = h;w (equivalently, married life begins with the capital brought in by the wife,
kw, and the capital endowment of her husband, ~ kw): In the patriarchal regime the husband
controls the allocation of the income derived from the total capital endowment k = kh + e kh.
I assume that husbands must guarantee their wives a minimum consumption level cw =
c > 0. Thus, the husband maximizes (1) subject to:





As noted previously, we solve for the e¢ cient level of investment in children. An easy way
to do this is to write the maximization problem as if siblings married one another since, in
that case, parental investment decisions would internalize both the child￿ s and child￿ s spouse￿ s
welfare.18
Thus, the value functions Vi must satisfy the recursive relationships:
18NB: This is a way to solve for the equilibrium allocation of capital; it is not a description of the marriage
market.
































where V 0 has been written as a function of both the investment in a son, k0
h, and in a daughter,
k0
w, rather than in a non-related spouse, e k0
i, as a way to solve for the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The husband￿ s and wife￿ s value functions under the NR regime are log-linear in
k ￿
c
A￿n (where k is the household￿ s total capital endowment) and take the forms:19
V
NR













































































(the NR superscript denotes the NR regime).
Proof. See the Appendix.jj













where k = kh + kw and k0 = k0
h + k0





























19We will impose conditions such that the value function is well de￿ned.
20The same ￿rst-order condition is obtained for k0
h and k0
w.
9Note that, in general, we cannot solve for k0
h and k0
w separately using this solution method
given that individual welfare depends only the total sum of household capital. In this case,
furthermore, given that there is an equal measure of women and men and that the distribution
of capital is degenerate (i.e. every household has the same endowment), there would be
multiple equilibria with respect to the division of k0 into k0
h and k0
w. k0 is uniquely determined,
however, and that is the only object of interest.21 This equilibrium is sustained by the strategy
of each individual of type i, i = w;h, to marry an individual whose bequest is no smaller that
k0
￿i.22 Thus if, for example, bequests are given equally to sons and daughters, all men have the





2 , where k
0
NR satis￿es (11). A similar strategy





2 ￿is held by women. Note that although women￿ s
consumption does not depend on either their own or their husband￿ s wealth, their welfare
is nonetheless an increasing function of the level of household capital as it increases their
children￿ s welfare.23
Before proceeding to characterize the equilibrium under equal rights, it is important to
place some restrictions on the parameters of the model. First, to ensure that the husband is
at least as well o⁄ as his wife we will require:
c
NR
h > c (12)
This assumption makes sense as we are studying a patriarchal system. This requires the
economy to be su¢ ciently wealthy (equivalently, c should be small enough) which we shall















as a necessary and su¢ cient condition.
In order for an economy that satis￿es A1 for k0 to continue to do so over time, the economy
should grow (which was the case for the historical period of interest). This requires:
k
0
NR > kNR (14)











Thus, the economy must be su¢ ciently productive relative to the growth rate of the popula-
tion. Note that A2 will always hold for A su¢ ciently high. We henceforth assume that the
economy satis￿es A1 and A2.
21Note that the multiplicity is only in the division of k0 into that which is bequeathed to sons versus
daughters. Neither consumption nor welfare is a⁄ected by this source of multiplicity and hence we ignore it.
22We are assuming throughout that the equilibrium welfare from marriage exceeds that of being single
(which is easy to ensure by adding a constant to the welfare from marriage).
23See Gall, Legros, and Newman (2009) for a more general discussion of when e¢ ciency obtains in models
with non-transferable utility.
10It is worth making a few remarks at this point. First, given A1 and A2, the value
functions V NR
j , j = h;w, given in (5) and (6) are well-de￿ned since these conditions ensure
(A ￿ n)k ￿ c > 0.24 Second, V NR
j is concave. Third, this economy exhibits endogenous
growth.
3.3 Equilibrium Under Equal Property Rights (ER)
Under the ER regime we assume that husbands and wives jointly own and control mari-
tal property so that the equilibrium allocation maximizes the equally weighted sum of both
spouses￿utilities. Thus, the solution must satisfy:


















Note that the weight placed on future generations￿welfare in (16) is twice that in the NR
regime as the allocation maximizes the sum of the husband￿ s and wife￿ s utility as opposed
to only the husband￿ s. On the other hand, the wife￿ s consumption is no longer a constant
and instead the allocation must maximize the sum of the log consumptions in addition to the
continuation value.
Lemma 2 The husband￿ s and wife￿ s value functions under the ER regime are equal and log-
linear in k (where k is the sum of each spouse￿ s capital endowment) and take the form:
V
ER
h (k) = V
ER













Proof. See the Appendix.jj
Returning to the maximization problem in (16), and substituting (17) for V 0


















where k = kh + kw and k0 = k0
h + k0
w.
Solving for consumption and k0 yields:.
24To see this right away, note that if a father with capital k were to bequeath each son-daughter pair k
0
= k
as well, this would yield him consumption ch = Ak ￿ nk ￿ c This expression must be positive since, by A2,
















Note that, as in the NR regime, we can only determine the aggregate bequest left to a house-
hold by the parents and parents-in-law rather than the separate amounts. As before, no
variable of interest (consumption, investment or individual welfare) depends on this multi-
plicity. The strategies that sustain this equilibrium are analogous to the ones for the NR
regime. If, for example, bequests are given equally to sons and daughters, all men have the





2 , where k
0
ER satis￿es (22). A similar strategy





2 ￿is held by women. Also note that the equilibrium for
this economy is the same as that obtained in the usual Ak growth model with in￿nitely lived
individuals except that consumption is shared between two individuals ￿the spouses ￿(hence
the 2 in (19)) and the capital bequest is divided among n households.
We can also require that this economy grow over time, as we did for the NR regime, i.e.,
k
0
ER > kER (23)





but this condition is not binding given A2:
3.4 Growth, Fertility, and Regime Change
This section analyzes the circumstances under which men would prefer the ER over the NR
regime. Rather than introduce a full-￿ edged political economy model, we ask the question: if
men faced a once-and-for-all choice between the patriarchal regime or switching to the equal
rights regime, which regime would they prefer? This is equivalent to asking whether V ER
h (k)
is greater than V NR
h (k). This framing eliminates any strategic considerations by limiting
the choice to one of electing between patriarchy forever or switching right away to the ER
regime. It would be easy to modify the model, however, and allow each generation to face
the option of switching or postponing the choice to the following generation (as in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000,2001)).25 This would preserve the comparative static results presented
in the three key propositions of this section.
It is useful to start by summarizing the allocation di⁄erences across regimes in a lemma.
Lemma 3 (i) cNR
h > cER
h ; (ii) cNR
w < cER
w ; (iii) k0
NR < k0
ER.
25An easy way to modify the model is to assume that it takes a period to implement the reform. This
would prevent each generation from prefering to postpone voting in favor of the reform and having the next
generation carry it out.
12Proof. These follow directly from comparing equations (21) and (10), and (22) and (11).jj
Thus, not surprisingly, a husband￿ s consumption is higher whereas his wife￿ s is lower under
NR than under ER. Capital accumulation (growth) is higher under ER for two reasons: ￿rst,
under ER the household internalizes the bene￿t to both spouses of an additional unit of
investment in a child (as opposed to solely the husband￿ s bene￿t in NR) and, second, the
value of an additional unit of investment in a child￿ s household (for any given level of k0) is
higher since the marginal unit will bene￿t equally both the child and the child￿ s spouse rather
than only the child.
We next turn to the ￿rst of our three main propositions. In this proposition we establish
that the reform of the property rights regime will happen in ￿nite time and characterize how
a man￿ s utility di⁄erential across regimes changes over time.
A few preliminary de￿nitions. Henceforth, we will use ￿Vh (k) to denote the di⁄erence in
men￿ s welfare in the NR versus ER regime at a capital stock of k, i.e.,
￿Vh (k) ￿ V
NR
h (k) ￿ V
ER
h (k)
Since the patriarchal system is supposed to be in men￿ s advantage, we will henceforth restrict
our attention to initial values of the capital stock, k0, such that ￿Vh (k0) > 0, i.e., men start
out strictly preferring the NR regime.26







and de￿ne k￿ as:
￿Vh(k
￿) = 0 (26)
Proposition 1 (Wealth): i. 8k < b k; ￿Vh (k) is increasing in k; 8k > b k; ￿Vh (k) is
decreasing in k: ii. Reform happens in ￿nite time, i.e., 9 k￿, b k < k￿ < 1, such that
8k > k￿, men strictly prefer the ER to the NR regime.
Proof. i: Taking the derivative of ￿Vh (k) with respect to k yields the necessary and su¢ cient




= b k (27)
ii: To show that eventually there will be a reform of property rights, note that we can











1￿￿ logk. Taking the limit as k goes to
in￿nity (which is valid as the capital stock does not converge in this model) yields lim
k*1
￿Vh =

























= ￿1. Thus, reform will










; zw +zh = z , guarantees V NR
h (k) > V ER
h (k) for z su¢ ciently large. Under the
NR regime, the husband would set zh = z, whereas under ER, zh = zw = z=2.
13happen at some ￿nite k, henceforth denoted k￿ (n). Note that since b k < k￿, (i) implies that
once the reform is passed, it will never be overturned.jj
Thus, the path of ￿Vh (k) is as depicted in Figure 1. The intuition for this shape is as
follows. At low levels of income (i.e., low k), consumption is relatively low. Hence, increases
in the capital stock have a relatively large impact on a husband￿ s welfare in the NR regime
since the marginal utility of consumption is high and the consumption is not shared with his
wife. In the ER regime, on the other hand, although the marginal utility of consumption
is even higher (since the husband￿ s consumption is lower), any additional income used for
consumption is shared with the man￿ s wife. Hence there is a range of k where the relative
attractiveness of the NR regime is increasing.27 Once k is greater than b k however, this is no
longer the case. At that point, a man would be better o⁄, were it possible, sacri￿cing some
of his own consumption in favor of his wife￿ s if his son-in-laws agreed to do the same. This
is a contract he cannot enforce, however. Thus, for k > b k, the relative attractiveness of the
NR regime is decreasing in k. For k su¢ ciently large, i.e., for all k > k￿, a man would be
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Figure 1
We next establish a relationship between fertility, the relative attractiveness of the two
regimes, and the timing of reform.
Proposition 2 (Fertility): i. For any level of household wealth k, there exists a critical value
of fertility, n￿ (k), such that 8 n 2 (0;n￿ (k)), men strictly prefer the ER to the NR regime.
ii. Reform happens sooner if n is lower.
27This can also be seen by taking the partial derivative of logcNR
h ￿logcER
h with respect to k (which, by the
envelope theorem, equals d￿Vh
dk ).
14Proof. i: We start by showing that ￿Vh (k;n) is increasing in n. Taking the derivative with













(A￿n)((A￿n)k￿c): For this to be positive requires:
(A ￿ n)((A ￿ n)k ￿ c) >





















As the RHS of this expression is increasing in n, we can substitute for n with its highest value
as implied by A2. This yields the condition 1 ￿
￿
2 ￿ 1
2; which holds 8￿ 2 [0;1].
Next, we show that lim















8k > k0, (where ￿ is a ￿nite constant). Thus, the ER regime dominates the NR regime at a
low enough level of fertility. Lastly, we can solve for n￿ (k) by solving:
￿Vh (k;n
￿) = 0 (29)
which by the ￿rst part of this proposition must be unique.
ii: To show that reform happens sooner when fertility is lower, it is su¢ cient to show that
k￿ is an increasing function of n and that k0
NR is a decreasing function of n (i.e., it takes a
higher level of the capital stock in order for men to be indi⁄erent and the growth rate of the




that in (i) we established that ￿Vh (k;n) is an increasing function of n and, from Proposition
1, we have that ￿Vh (k;n) is a decreasing function of k, 8k > b k (n). Since k￿ > b k, it follows
that dk￿
dn > 0. Next, di⁄erentiating k0
NR with respect to n yields, after some manipulation
and using A2, dk0
dn < 0.jj
The proposition above establishes that the reform of women￿ s property rights will happen
earlier if fertility is lower. This e⁄ect can be seen graphically in Figure 2. The e⁄ect of
a decrease in n is to decrease both b k (the point at which the welfare di⁄erential becomes
decreasing in k) and k￿ (the point at which men are indi⁄erent between the two regimes), and
to accelerate the pace of investment, leading reform to occur sooner.
The conclusion above follows from the concavity of the utility function over own and
children￿ s consumptions. As fertility decreases, the amount bequeathed to each household
will increase. Under NR, this increases a son￿ s welfare both by increasing his consumption
and by increasing the welfare of his o⁄spring. The welfare of a daughter, on the other hand,
only increases because of the second channel. Thus, although the welfare of both sons and
daughters increases, so does the disparity in their welfare levels. In particular, the di⁄erence
between logch and logc is increasing as n falls. Concavity implies that the gains to equalizing
the consumption of the spouses is increasing in this gap, thereby increasing the attractiveness
of the ER regime. Thus, at some critical level of fertility, n￿ (k), a father is made better o⁄
sacri￿cing the consumption bene￿ts he obtains from being sel￿sh with his wife in order to be
able to ensure that his sons-in-laws are equally generous towards his daughters.
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We now turn to the last main proposition that precedes the empirical section. Here we
examine the implications of an NR regime that for some reason (e.g. higher outside options
or a legal system more favorable to women) provides married women with a higher level of
consumption, i.e., c is larger. Will such a system, which decreases husbands￿consumption
bene￿ts from patriarchy, lead men to reform the property rights system sooner? Perhaps
surprisingly, the answer is no.
Proposition 3 (Wife￿ s welfare): A higher level of c delays the reform of women￿ s property
rights.
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that an increase in c increases k￿ and decreases k0
NR.
Di⁄erentiating V NR




Thus, in this range, a husband￿ s utility is decreased by the higher level of c (though, by
de￿nition of k0, he still prefers the NR regime). As capital accumulation continues eventually
k will be larger than b k. As of this point, a larger c implies a higher value of V NR
h (k); 8k >
b k, which also implies that k￿ is larger. Next, di⁄erentiating k0
NR (in (11)) with respect to c




Diagrammatically, the e⁄ect of an increase in c can be seen in Figure 3. An increase in
c decreases the attractiveness of the patriarchal regime at low levels of wealth (k < b k) and
increases it at higher levels of wealth
￿
k > b k
￿
. Intuitively, when income is low, a husband is
made worse o⁄sacri￿cing a greater part of income to his wife even if it improves his daughters￿
welfare (as they too will enjoy the higher level of c). The opposite is true once income is
high enough and this renders the NR regime relatively more attractive, thus increasing the
level of wealth at which men are indi⁄erent between the two regimes (i.e., increasing k￿).
16Furthermore, the pace of capital accumulation slows down at all levels of k as more income is
diverted to the wife￿ s consumption.
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3.5 Discussion of Assumptions and Extensions
The model made several assumptions, some merely for simplicity and notational ease whereas
some play a more fundamental role. For example, all consumption in the household is assumed
to be private, parents care about their sons and daughters equally, and the ER regime places
equal weight on the welfare of both spouses. None of these assumptions are central to the
main results of the paper. In particular, one can assume that some portion of consumption
consists of a public household good, that parents value sons more (or less) than daughters, or
that the weight placed on a wife￿ s welfare under ER is less than half. The ￿non-paternalistic￿
dynastic welfare assumption is also very easy to relax. In general, any formulation in which
parents have concave utility over their children￿ s consumption will do.
The use of log preferences over consumption allows the model to be solved analytically.
One cost of using logs, however, is that requires us to assume that the man places no weight
on his spouse￿ s utility as otherwise her consumption will grow at the same rate as his and thus
the utility di⁄erential will remain constant. This is not a property of preferences in general,
however, and thus not particularly troubling.28 Theoretically, the property preferences need
28Furthermore, if there is heterogeneity across men in how much they value their wives (i.e., in the weight
that they attach to a spouse￿ s welfare), then a father will fear that his daughter may marry a man who will
mistreat her (i.e., allocate her a low level of consumption). I conjecture that this formulation will yield similar
comparative statics results as in the key propositions.
17to satisfy is that the welfare cost in terms of the disparity in children￿ s consumption outweigh
at some point the consumption bene￿ts from being sel￿sh with one￿ s wife (i.e., not sharing
consumption equally with her). What this requires is easiest to understand in a much simpler
setting with 2 periods and no allocation decisions. Suppose that under NR a husband
consumes y ￿ x, x < y=2, his sons consume Ay ￿ x, A > 1, and his daughters consume
x, whereas under ER their consumptions are given by, respectively, y=2, Ay=2, and Ay=2.
Comparing the utility di⁄erential under the two regimes, yields:
￿Vh = u(y ￿ x) ￿ u(y=2) + ￿=2(u(Ay ￿ x) + u(x) ￿ 2u(Ay=2))
Di⁄erentiating this with respect to y yields the comparative statics with respect to higher
income. If the marginal utility of consumption becomes su¢ ciently low at high levels of y,
then eventually this expression is guaranteed to become negative. If x is increasing with y,
then its rate of increase needs to be su¢ ciently small so that, in the long run, it is outweighed
by the di⁄erence in marginal utilities under the two regimes.
The assumption that the marriage market is large and competitive (yielding e¢ cient invest-
ment in children from the point of view of the parents-in-law) is also not essential. Assuming
that matching is random, for example, yields ine¢ cient investment in children but the basic
results of the model still hold.29
Introducing endogenous fertility while preserving an analytical solution could be achieved
by modifying the model so that parents obtain utility from the number of children they have
(e.g., logn) and investment is in children￿ s human capital (with a time cost so as to obtain the
traditional quality-quantity tradeo⁄), and with Cobb-Douglas production in male and female
human capital (see, e.g., Doepke and Tertilt (2009)). The disadvantage of this alternative is
that it makes an interpretation of growth in any sector other than home production di¢ cult.
It is also possible to extend the model to a population with an initial non-degenerate
distribution of capital, G(k0). After some work, one can show that the marriage pattern
would be perfectively assortative. The comparative statics results with respect to k now
hold for the cross-section at any point in time rather than for the dynamic process. This
extension can generate results such as the existence of time periods in which both rich and
poor men are relatively more favorable towards the ER regime than men in the middle of the
wealth distribution (if, for example, poor men have capital signi￿cantly below b k, rich men have
signi￿cantly greater capital than b k, and men in the middle of the distribution have capital
that is close to b k). Although the data that I present in the next section do not allow me to
examine the cross-sectional predictions of heterogeneity in household wealth, it is nonetheless
important to keep these results in mind since the dynamic predictions of the model will now
depend on the exact political economy model used to aggregate preferences.
Preferences over the property rights regime will also vary across the population if a house-
hold￿ s ratio of sons to daughters is stochastic. Suppose that families have the same number
of children, 2n, n 2 f1;2;::ng, but now allow the sex to be determined by a random draw.









population will have more girls than boys and the same proportion will have more boys than
29See FernÆndez and Zilberman (2009) on the relationship between marital systems and growth.
18girls. Thus, the median preferences in the population will be held by those individuals who






￿2n. Thus, one way to inter-
pret the theoretical analysis is as a description of the regime preferences of the median voter,
i.e., those corresponding to those individuals with equal numbers of boys and girls.30 It is
important to note however that, unlike in the case of wealth heterogeneity (in which wealth
increases could either strengthen or weaken a man￿ s preferences for the NR regime depend-
ing on his wealth level), a decrease in the number of children a⁄ect all men￿ s preferences in
the same direction ￿i.e., they all become less favorable to the NR regime. The opposite
conclusion holds, of course, for an increase in n.
4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical section of this paper uses variation across states and over time in the key vari-
ables and in the timing of reform of women￿ s property rights to examine the main propositions
of the model. In particular, the model predicts that lower fertility should be correlated with
a higher probability of reform whereas di⁄erences across states that impact positively on mar-
ried women￿ s welfare should be correlated with a lower probability of reform. The relationship
of wealth to the timing of reform is, on the other hand, non-monotonic since more capital is
associated ￿rst with a lower probability of reform and later with a higher probability.31
The next few sections introduce the main empirical variables, discuss the sample, and
conduct a Probit and linear probability analysis using state ￿xed e⁄ects. A subsequent section
explores the use of child mortality as an instrument for the relevant measure of survival-fertility
(FERTILITY10). The empirical analysis concludes with a discussion of robustness.
4.1 Data, Key Variables, and Sample
The empirical analysis requires extensive use of state-level data from the Census, the construc-
tion of an appropriate fertility variable, and the dating of the property and earnings reforms.
Below I discuss the key variables constructed for each decade between 1850-1920 and some
characteristics of the sample before presenting the empirical analysis. Tables A1 and A2 in
the Appendix shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the main variables.
Married Women￿ s Property Rights
The property rights variable is from Geddes and Lueck (2002).32 The authors used
legal treatises and original state session laws to determine when a property act gave women
management and control of their separate estate and when they obtained ownership and
control of their earnings.33 I use the same property/earnings rights outcomes as the authors,
30Alternatively, the preceding analysis can be thought of as applying to the representative male individual
before he knows the gender composition of his children.
31One can think of the timing of reform as being probabilistic by adding a random variable "it to the relative
welfare of the two regimes, ￿Vh, in state i at time t.
32I thank the authors for providing me with the data set containing the timing of the reforms and several
state variables.
33See their paper for details.
19employing a dummy variable denoted ￿BOTH￿which takes the value one when both of these
rights have been granted (and a zero otherwise).
Figure 4

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There was considerable time variation in the granting of property rights to women. The
￿rst state to grant both property rights was Massachusetts in 1846 and the last was Louisiana
20in 1980. By 1920, all states with the exception of four (Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Louisiana) had passed both property acts. Although the exact date that should be imputed
to the last four states to grant these rights is debatable since the legal system a⁄ecting women
had changed radically over this long time period, we can ignore these complications by ending
the analysis in 1920s (as in Geddes and Lueck). Figure 4 shows the time-line for adoption of
these rights from 1845 to 1920 and Figure 5 provides a map of the US with the timing of the
reforms.34
The basic empirical exercise consists of estimating the probability that women had been












where yit is the observed state law variable BOTH in state i at time t and y￿
it is the unobserved
legal rights "response" in that state and year, xit is the column vector of exogenous variables,
dt is a year t dummy, and "it is normally distributed. Thus a state/territory is observed a
maximum of eight times.
Survival-Fertility and Wealth
According to the theory, the variable of interest is not fertility, but rather the number
of sons and daughters that survive to adulthood. In particular, fathers care about the
consequences of the property laws as they apply to married sons and daughters which requires
children to survive to that age. During the eighty years that concern us, the mortality of
infants and young children decreased signi￿cantly in the US. Infant mortality (for whites),
for example, is estimated to have dropped from 216.8 (per 1000 births) in 1850 to 110.8 in
1900 and then to 82.1 in 1920.35 Thus, it would be a mistake to examine fertility measures
(e.g. ￿children ever born￿or a total fertility rate) that did not take into account childhood
mortality. This is fortunate as the US Census did not ask women how many children they
had (￿children ever born￿ ) until 1900.36
To obtain a measure of survival-fertility, I use the number of (older) children per woman
as this variable can be constructed by using state census data from the relevant decade (1850-
1920). As the computation of a children-per-woman ratio requires data only on the population
by age and sex, it provides an index of fertility when reliable birth statistics are not available
and is consequently widely used in the demographic and development literature. I include
in children all individuals between the ages of 10 to 19 years and in women I include all
34Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the analysis.
35See Haines (2008). The decrease in mortality was large in every decade with the exception of 1880.
36While it is possible to use the answers provided by di⁄erent cohorts in 1900 to obtain an estimate of how
fertility varied across states before then, there are some signi￿cant problems with doing so. In particular,
there is selection bias arising from survival which is especially large for the earliest decades. Another problem
is the absence of information on where the woman lived during her child-raising years. This complicates the
state-assignment problem, especially for those women who reside in a state di⁄erent from that of their birth.
21females between the ages of 20 to 39 years.37;38 I restrict the sample to whites (non-blacks)
as men in this racial category were the ones with political power. This variable, hereafter
denoted FERTILITY10, also has the advantage that, by using older children, it alleviates
most reasonable concerns about reverse causality (i.e. women￿ s fertility behavior anticipating
the reforms) since these children would have been born, on average, twenty years before the
reforms were instituted.
There is considerable variation in FERTILITY10, not only over time, but also across states.
FERTILITY10 went from an average across states of 1.66 in 1850 to 1.26 in 1920. Figure 6
shows, for each decade in the period 1850-1920, the evolution of the average value of FERTIL-
ITY10 across states (the bold line), its range (as given by the upper and lower bars), and its

























As a proxy for capital I use ￿taxable￿wealth per capita (WEALTHpc) de￿ ated into 1982
dollars.39 WEALTHpc is the value of all private real and personal property and excludes
such ￿exempt￿ property as government, charitable, and religious property. The mean of
WEALTHpc over the sample is $13,664 with a standard deviation of $9579. Throughout the
regression tables, this variable is divided by 10,000.
37A more traditional de￿nition is to have women from age 15 to 44 but I use a tighter age range since I am
looking at changes from decade to decade.
38I wish to thank Michael Haines for providing me with the raw census data to perform these calculations.
39This is the same variable constructed by Geddes and Lueck (2002) to test their hypothesis. The wealth
data is available from a special Census publication published in 1924 that compiled all Census wealth estimates
from 1850￿ 1922 (Wealth, Public Debt and Taxation: 1922). See Geddes and Lueck (2000) for details on how
the data was de￿ ated to 1982 dollars.
22Variation Across States: Territorial Status and Legal System
During this time period, the territorial organization of the United States was still evolving.
In particular, several states belonged during a portion of this period to some organized territory
and a few to an unorganized territory. Although states that belonged to a territory were able
to reform their property rights laws before becoming independent states (e.g. Wyoming in
1869 and Colorado in 1868), they may nonetheless di⁄er in important ways from independent
states. Consequently, the empirical analysis will control for territorial status.40
Another potentially important di⁄erence across states is with respect to their legal systems.
The vast majority of states closely followed English common law.41 Under common law, all
property except land and improvements (realty) were owned by the women￿ s husband and
the woman￿ s realty (and its pro￿ts) came under the husband￿ s control. If a child had been
born during the marriage, then a husband continued to possess his wife￿ s real estate for life
(a practice known as "curtesy"). If a wife survived her husband, she was guaranteed a dower
of one-third of the pro￿ts from the realty he owned during the marriage.
In England, a special court known as chancery court had developed over the centuries to
deal with the rigidities of the common law and the hardships it imposed on special cases.
Equity law ￿the jurisprudence dispensed through the chancery court ￿allowed a woman,
with her husband￿ s consent, to transfer property to be administered by trustees either prior to
or after the marriage. This arrangement primarily allowed wealthy women (or their fathers)
with strong bargaining position relative to their spouses to shield the family￿ s property.
Fourteen states had equity courts.42 As equity law a⁄orded more protection to women￿ s
property, the theory predicts (Proposition 3) that this would tend to delay the reform of
property rights. On the other hand, since this provision primarily bene￿tted a small minority
of wealthier women, it may not have had much of an impact on the timing of reform.43
Another potentially important source of legal di⁄erences is that some states with French
or Spanish in￿ uence did not adopt a common law arrangement for family property and in-
stead chose or inherited a community property system (as in most of continental Europe and
Mexico).44 The continental (civil law) model, like the common law model, gave tremendous
power to the husband over the wife, but it treated property (at least what was acquired dur-
ing marriage) as joint. This system was thus more favorable to wives as they automatically
inherited half of marital property relative to the third that was customary under common law.
The theory would predict, in this case, that reforms would happen later in these states.
The legal system of the states did not change during this period with the exception of
40Note that it is important not to over-represent states by assigning to each one individually the variable
outcome that belongs to the aggregate territory. There is an error in this respect in Geddes and Lueck (2002),
though it does not appear to a⁄ect the conclusions of the analysis ￿see table 2.
41Basch (1982, p. 16-17) cites 19th century legal analysts as noting that in no other area was the corre-
spondence between the American and English legal systems closer than in the law of wife and husband.
42The states are: CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, NJ, NH, NJ, NY, RI, SC, and VT.
43Furthermore, some states did not enforce equitable doctrines relating to married women￿ s separate estates.
See Salmon (1986) and Chused (1983).
44The states are: AZ, CA, ID, LA, NV, NM, TX, and WA. See Warbasse (1987) for the experience of
Louisiana which was the sole state that had this system in the ￿rst quarter of the 19th century. See Glaeser
and Shleifer (2002) for a discussion of the important di⁄erences in other arenas between the English common
law and French civil law.
23Nevada, Idaho, and Washington which went from being under common law while they were
territories to having a community law system once they became independent. Thus, when we
include state-territory ￿xed e⁄ects, the presence of an equity system will be absorbed and the
e⁄ect of community law relative to common law will be identi￿ed only by these three states
changing their legal system.
The Sample
The sample consists of all those states-years (including those states that belonged to ter-
ritories) for which data was available for the key variables. For any regression speci￿cation
that required wealth, there were 356 state-year observations.45
Table 1 summarizes the mean FERTILITY10 and WEALTHpc levels for each decade be-
tween 1850 and 1920, dividing the sample into those states/territories which had already
granted women property rights, i.e., BOTH = 1 (the column headed by ￿yes￿ ), and those
that had not (the column headed by ￿no￿ ). The number of observations in each category
is also reported.46 As can be seen, for every decade, states in which women had obtained
property rights on average had lower FERTILITY10. Furthermore, with the exception of 1860,
per-capita wealth levels were also on average higher in those states.
Table 1 Both women's rights?
mean # obs mean # obs
1850 real wealth per capita 4707 33 9586 1
fertility10 1.69 33 1.14 1
1860 real wealth per capita 9908 33 6856 5
fertility10 1.53 33 1.32 5
1870 real wealth per capita 6162 35 8581 11
fertility10 1.51 35 1.32 11
1880 real wealth per capita 7895 15 11511 31
fertility10 1.44 15 1.36 31
1890 real wealth per capita 12333 11 15735 37
fertility10 1.57 11 1.38 37
1900 real wealth per capita 11745 9 16569 39
fertility10 1.49 9 1.34 39
1910 real wealth per capita 16188 8 21180 40
fertility10 1.35 8 1.25 40
1920 real wealth per capita 19333 4 23394 44
fertility10 1.33 4 1.24 44
Notes: 356 observations; fertility10 = # of children between 10 to 19 / # of women
between 20 to 39.
Source: US Census.
no yes
4.2 Regression Analysis: Probit and OLS
Before proceeding with the analysis, I ￿rst examine the e⁄ect of contemporaneous per-capita
wealth at the state level (WEALTHpc) on the probability that both reforms were undertaken
45If wealth was not required, then the sample size could be increased by three observations. Since the
increase was so small, I kept the same 356 sample throughout.
46The number of observations changes over time since some states were not yet part of the US in some
decades and because wealth data was unavailable for some states (territories) in the earliest decades.
24without including FERTILITY10. The purpose of this exercise, reported in Table 2, is to
verify that the data replicates the main ￿nding of Geddes and Lueck (2002) who argued that
the reforms were a result of the greater ine¢ ciency associated with increased wealth under
the system of coverture. The coe¢ cients reported in the table are the marginal e⁄ects of the
independent variables, where the latter are evaluated at their mean values.
As shown in Probit analysis reported in Table 2, the marginal e⁄ect of per-capita wealth
is always positive and signi￿cant. The ￿rst column includes only wealth as a control and the
second column adds a year ￿xed e⁄ect to the Probit estimation. The third column introduces
a dummy variable for whether the state was still a territory that year since, as explained
previously, many present-day states were organized into territories during some of the time
under consideration and they may have characteristics that di⁄er from independent states.
Introducing this variable, absent in Geddes and Lueck, doesn￿ t change the magnitude and
signi￿cance of wealth though it is associated with a delay in married women￿ s rights.
Probit: dependent variable = BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WEALTHpc 0.264** 0.124* 0.124* 0.224**







Year dummies no yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 356
Pseudo R
2 0.16 0.37 0.41 0.52
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
robust z statistics in parentheses. Notes: marginal effects
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables;
WEALTHpc is wealth per capita divided by 10000.
Table 2 - Wealth and Property Rights
The last column in Table 2 controls for important di⁄erences across states in aspects of their
legal system. In particular, I control for whether the state had either a common law system
either with or without an equity court (the latter is the omitted variable) or a community
property system. As discussed earlier, the equity court made it easier for wealthier women
to contract around coverture whereas a community property system stipulated that spouses
equally owned property acquired during marriage although only the husband had control of
joint property and wealth. Thus, married women were, ceteris paribus, better o⁄ in these
states, which would decrease the pressure to give women fuller property rights. Indeed, as
shown in the table, territories and states with a community property system were slower to
adopt both reforms (they were 62% less likely to do so than an equivalent state under common
law). The e⁄ect of an equity court, on the other hand, is statistically insigni￿cant. In the
last speci￿cation, an increase in per-capita wealth of $6000 (a bit over the standard deviation
of the variable net of the variation due to year ￿xed e⁄ects) is associated with approximately
25a 13% increase in the probability that the reform is adopted (where all variables are evaluated
at their mean).47
I next turn to the main analysis that incorporates all the variables of interest. Table
3 displays the results of the Probit estimation. As in table 2, the ￿rst column shows the
simple negative correlation that exists between FERTILITY10 and BOTH and the second
column adds year ￿xed e⁄ects. The third column includes per-capita wealth. This variable,
however, is no longer statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels. The fourth columns adds
a dummy variable for whether the state belonged to a territory at that time, and the ￿fth
column controls for state di⁄erences in legal system. Belonging to a territory or possessing
a community property system are negatively correlated with changing the property rights
regime. A community property system, ceteris paribus, reduces the probability of a reform
by 64%; belonging to a territory decreases the probability of reform by 48%. Throughout,
the e⁄ect of FERTILITY10 is always negative and signi￿cant, as predicted by the theory. In
the last speci￿cation, a decrease in FERTILITY10 by 0.12 children per women (this is a one-
standard-deviation decrease in the variable where the variation is net of year ￿xed e⁄ects) is
associated with a increase in the probability of women￿ s property rights of around 12 %. This
is larger than in the speci￿cation without controls for di⁄erences in legal systems, indicating
that on average states with community systems had lower FERTILITY10 levels.
Dependent variable = BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FERTILITY10 -0.902** -0.690** -0.627** -0.875** -0.979**
(7.45) (5.36) (4.15) (5.02) (5.00)








Year dummies no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 356 356
Pseudo R
2 0.14 0.39 0.39 0.46 0.56
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
robust z statistics in parentheses. Notes: FERTILITY10 is the number
of children between 10 to 19 divided by the number of women between;
20 to 39; see Table 2 for additional notes.
Table 3 - Property Rights: Probit Analysis
Table 4 repeats the same set of exercises using a linear probability model instead. The
pattern of results is very similar. Fertility continues to be negatively and statistically signif-
icantly associated with the probability of changing women￿ s property rights regime as is the
existence of a community property legal system or belonging to a territory.
47Throughout, instead of using the raw standard deviation, I use the standard deviation of the residuals
from a regression of the pertinent variable (e.g. wealth) on the relevant ￿xed e⁄ects (e.g., on year dummies
or on both year and state dummies). The magnitudes of these are reported in table A1.
26Dependent variable = BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FERTILITY10 -0.769** -0.369** -0.323** -0.401** -0.378**
(9.39) (4.75) (3.58) (4.41) (3.22)








CONSTANT 1.663** 0.648** 0.556** 0.729** 0.716**
(14.39) (4.73) (3.35) (4.40) (3.30)
Year dummies no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 356 356
Adj. R
2 0.17 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.56
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
robust t statistics in parentheses; see Tables 2 and 3 for additional
notes.
Table 4 - Property Rights: OLS
Figure 7
US Territory Configuration, September 9 1850
A more challenging test of the theory is posed by introducing state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects.
To construct the state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects, I use the con￿guration of states and territories
that existed in September 1850 as shown in ￿gure 7.48 At this point in time, all but 16 states
have their actual borders. If a current-day state was also a state in 1850, it is assigned its
48See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_evolution_of_the_United_States.
27own (state) ￿xed e⁄ect. If, on the other hand, it was part of a territory in 1850, I assign it a
territory ￿xed e⁄ect based on the territory to which it belonged to then. Hence Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho are assigned to Oregon territory; Utah and Nevada are assigned to Utah
territory; New Mexico and Arizona are assigned to New Mexico territory; Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma are assigned to the same unorganized territory;
and lastly North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota are part of the Minnesota territory.49
If a state belonged to two territories in 1850, I assign it to the territory that encompassed
most of its land.
The results of the linear probability model with state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects are shown
in the ￿rst four columns of Table 5.50 Comparing these results with those reported in
table 4, the inclusion of state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects leaves almost unchanged the negative
e⁄ect of belonging to a territory as well as the insigni￿cant and close to zero e⁄ect of per-
capita wealth. It also decreases somewhat the magnitude of the coe¢ cient associated with
FERTILITY10, though the variable remains economically and statistically signi￿cant. A
one-standard-deviation decrease in FERTILITY10 is now associated with approximately a 6%
increase in the probability of property-law reform.51 As discussed earlier, the e⁄ect of an
equity system is absorbed in the state ￿xed e⁄ects whereas the community property system
is identi￿ed only o⁄ the three states that switched once they became independent states.
Not surprisingly, the statistical signi￿cance of the latter e⁄ect is smaller and the coe¢ cient is
smaller but still negative and quantitatively important ￿the presence of a community property
system is now associated with a bit over an 18.5% decrease in the probability of property rights
reform.
Column 5 of table 5 repeats the full speci￿cation of the previous column but it includes as
well the squared value of WEALTHpc in order to test directly for the non-monotonic e⁄ect of
wealth predicted by the model. As shown, the e⁄ect of this variable continues to be statis-
tically insigni￿cant. It should be noted that omitting FERTILITY10 also yields statistically
insigni￿cant coe¢ cients as do all state ￿xed-e⁄ect speci￿cations that include a year dummy.
I have also experimented with using other measures that may proxy for wealth. For example,
columns 6 and 7 in table 8 in the robustness section control for the percentage of school-age
children (excluding slaves) that attend school.52 Column six includes only girls and column
seven adds boys. As shown, FERTILITY10 and community property law remain negative and
statistically signi￿cant and neither schooling measure is signi￿cant.
One can also repeat the regression analysis using regional ￿xed e⁄ects instead of state/territory
￿xed e⁄ects. Columns 6-9 of table 5 show the results, employing the 9 regional dummies
used by the US Census. The pattern of results is very similar to those with state ￿xed e⁄ects
and to those obtained in table 4. A one-standard-deviation decrease in FERTILITY10 is now
associated with approximately a 7% increase in the probability of property-law reform. A
community property law system is associated with a 40% decrease in the probability of reform
relative to a common law system.
Why does there exist a statistically signi￿cant relationship between survival-fertility and
49At this point in time, North and South Dakota are not distinct ￿they constitute Dakota.
50Using a Probit speci￿cation instead drops over 100 observations.
51The standard deviation of fertility net of the variation from year and state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects is 0.21.
52These are children from the age of 5-19.
28reform but not between the latter and per-capita wealth? A possible answer may lie in the
non-uniform response to a wealth increase when there is heterogeneity in wealth as compared
with the qualitatively similar response to a fertility decrease independently of the wealth
distribution.
As discussed in section (3:5), if individuals have on average fewer children, this will make
them all more in favor of reform, regardless of their personal wealth,. The e⁄ect of an
increase in everyone￿ s wealth, on the other hand, can di⁄er along the wealth distribution. In
particular, it is possible that it would make poorer individuals more in favor of the patriarchal
regime and richer individuals more against it. How it a⁄ects individuals in the middle of the
distribution will depend on how their high wealth is relative to b k (see the discussion in section
(3:5)). Thus, the sign of the e⁄ect of a wealth increase on regime preferences depends both
on the distribution of capital and on how the political system aggregates preferences. Hence,
obtaining the theoretically correct partial correlation between wealth and reform requires also
getting the political economy aggregation mechanism "right," something that is not required
for the survival-fertility predictions (as long as, on average, this variable decreases for all
segments of society).
Dependent variable = BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FERTILITY10 -0.208* -0.191+ -0.253* -0.293* -0.293* -0.309** -0.247* -0.314** -0.366**
(2.07) (1.74) (2.12) (2.44) (2.45) (2.98) (2.14) (2.71) (3.06)
WEALTHpc 0.013 -0.021 -0.015 0.027 0.047 -0.001 0.009




TERRITORY -0.256* -0.262* -0.253* -0.314** -0.284**
(2.26) (2.36) (2.28) (3.35) (3.25)
EQUITY -0.044
(0.56)
COMMUNITY -0.186+ -0.187+ -0.399**
(1.74) (1.76) (6.02)
CONSTANT 0.381 0.351 0.476+ 0.434 0.542+ 0.641** 0.523** 0.660** 0.770**
(1.56) (1.35) (1.71) (1.55) (1.92) (4.01) (2.81) (3.55) (3.52)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes no no no no
Region dummies no no no no no yes yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356
Adj. R
2 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.57
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust t statistics in parentheses; see Tables 2 and 3 for
additional notes.
Table 5 - Property Rights: OLS with State or Regional Fixed Effects
4.3 Instrumental Variable Analysis
The analysis presented above shows that, as predicted by the theory, there is a robust negative
correlation between women￿ s property rights and both FERTILITY10 and community property
law. This is interesting in and of itself as it indicates that the theories that address this issue
should be capable of generating these robust correlations. We next turn to the issue of
endogeneity.
29It may be that the presence of a community property law (which re￿ ects either Spanish
or French in￿ uence) also signals a more favorable attitude in general towards women. To
the extent that this is true, however, the results demonstrate that these attitudes do not
accelerate the reform of women￿ s property rights. Instead, as predicted by the model, they
delay granting women the ability to manage and control their property and earnings.
Fertility is an endogenous variable. This raises the question as to whether FERTILITY10 is
simply proxying for an omitted variable. To the extent that the main variable driving fertility
is wealth, the analysis attempts to distinguish between it and FERTILITY10 by including them
simultaneously in the regression analysis. To eliminate other concerns, however, requires an
instrumental variable. In this section I explore using child mortality as an instrument for
FERTILITY10.
Child mortality is potentially an instrument for FERTILITY10. To see why this is, we can
start with the de￿nition of survival-fertility below:
surviving children
women
￿ avg: fertility per woman x (1 ￿ child mortality rate) (30)
Thus, survival-fertility is a function of the child mortality rate both directly and through
any e⁄ect it may have on average fertility. If a family desires to have some ideal number
of children, for example, a higher child mortality rate makes it costlier to achieve this ideal,
leading to a lower number of surviving children. If there is a higher than expected child
mortality, this will also lead families to have a lower number of surviving children.53 Thus,
both expected and unexpected higher levels of child mortality may tend to be associated with
a lower number of surviving children per woman (i.e., with FERTILITY10). In any case,
this is an empirical question. As will be shown below, for any given decade the correlation
between the two variables is indeed negative.
During this period in US history, both fertility and child mortality dropped rapidly. Using
statistics reported for the US in Haines (2008), between 1850 to 1920 white infant mortality
decreased by 62.1% whereas the total fertility rate for white women decreased by 41.5%
(alternatively the white birth rate ￿births per 1000 population per annum ￿decreased by
37.9%).54 As can be seen from equation (30), what governs whether the number of surviving
children per woman increases or decreases is whether the percentage increase in the child
survival rate (1 minus the child mortality rate) is greater or smaller than the percentage
decrease in fertility. For the numbers given above, the percentage change in children￿ s survival
rate is smaller (in absolute value) than the percentage change in children born, giving rise to
the decreasing FERTILITY10 pattern that we saw in the data in ￿gure 1. The inclusion of
a year dummy, however, turns the correlation between the two variables negative, as can be
seen by comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 6. In particular, in every decade, the correlation
between FERTILITY10 and child mortality is negative.
53On the other hand, if there is variance in the child mortality rate, risk aversion may lead to a positive
correlation.
54The American experience is distinctive from most other Western countries in that its fertility decline
started very early (in the late 18th or early 19th century) and it preceded the mortality decline. See Haines
(2008).
30Of course, child mortality is itself an endogenous variable and thus there may exist an
omitted variable that both a⁄ects its value and has an independent e⁄ect on property rights
reform. I will now argue, however, that the likely sources of endogeneity will bias the survival-
fertility estimates upwards (i.e., in the direction opposite to the one predicted by the theory).
One might speculate, for example, that states in which women had more political in￿ u-
ence might have both earlier reform of property rights and better children mortality outcomes.
Indeed, as shown recently in a very interesting paper by Miller (2009), states that granted
women su⁄rage saw large increases in local public health spending and declines in child mor-
tality. This would imply, however, that states in which child mortality was lower, ceteris
paribus, should also have earlier reform of their property rights regime. Given the negative
correlation between FERTILITY10 and child mortality, however, this channel would lead to a
positive coe¢ cient on FERTILITY10 (i.e., lower child mortality is correlated with higher FER-
TILITY10 and earlier reform). As we will show, the opposite is the case. Thus, this channel
of endogeneity cannot be driving the results although it may bias the estimate towards zero.
Alternatively, it may be that wealthier states put more resources into public health leading
to lower levels of child mortality and that women￿ s rights, as many believe, is simply a normal
or luxury good. Once again, the fact that FERTILITY10 and child mortality are negatively
correlated implies that this channel would lead to a positive coe¢ cient on FERTILITY10, the
opposite of what we ￿nd.
Of course, there may exist some other omitted variable a⁄ecting both child mortality
and women￿ s rights. The factors responsible for the cross-state variation in the reduction
of child mortality are not clear. It mostly seems to be driven by idiosyncratic di⁄erences
in the di⁄usion of knowledge and best practice across municipalities. Preston and Haines￿
(1991) book, Fatal Years, a fascinating study of child mortality in the 19th century US, cites
the description given by ￿rst professor of pediatrics at Harvard in 1891 about the state of
knowledge of childhood diseases: this consisted of "a poor subterfuge of unreal facts forming
structures of misleading results which in the scienti￿c medicine of adults would not for a
second be tolerated."55 For many people (including doctors), the high death rates of infants
and young children seem to be the result of a natural and inevitable vulnerability in this stage
of life. Preston and Haines￿analysis concludes that there was relatively little di⁄erentiation
in child mortality levels according to father￿ s occupation, so that (controlling for race) it is
unlikely that state di⁄erences in the distribution of income played an important role. Large
cities, on the other hand, had higher child mortality levels and thus a variable capturing
urbanization will be included in the IV analysis as well as di⁄erences in per-capita wealth.
State ￿xed e⁄ects will capture geographic di⁄erences and di⁄erences in racial composition.
Nonetheless, as I am unable to rule out the existence of an omitted variable, the instrumental
variable exercise must be treated as suggestive rather than de￿nitive.56
An additional drawback with using child mortality as an instrument is the quality of the
data. It is very di¢ cult to ￿nd numbers for infant/child mortality by state over most of
this time period. I rely on estimates provided by Murphy, Simon, and Tamura (2008) for
55Preston and Haines (1991), p. 12.
56What then is driving the variation in child mortality across states? From my reading of the literature,
there appears to have been a great deal of idiosyncratic variation in the rate in which municipalities adopted
sanitation reforms though it would be good to have sytematic evidence for this.
31child mortality prior to the age of 10.57 The authors construct their estimates using o¢ cial
death registrations (which ￿rst become available in 1890 for some states and are reported in
the Statistical Abstract of the United States) and the Census (which is less reliable since it is
based on answers to survey questions rather than o¢ cial data).58
Child mortality varies signi￿cantly by state/territory and by decade as can be seen in
￿gure 8; it averaged 35% across states in 1850 and decreased to a mean of 13% in 1920.
Over this time period the leading causes of children￿ s death were gastrointestinal diseases
(e.g., cholera infantum, enteritis, and diarrhea), respiratory diseases (e.g., pneumonia and
bronchitis), and other infectious diseases (e.g. measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, whooping
cough, and smallpox).59 Much of the decline in infant mortality came from improvements in
overall hygiene, the water supply, the construction of sewers, and the quality and cleanliness
of the milk supply.
Figure 8

























57I wish to thank Robert Tamura for very kindly making this data available to me.
58The authors use a fairly complicated procedure to produce their estimates. For each state/territory, they
run a quadratic speci￿cation of the infant survival rate on time for the years 1890 to 2000 using the number of
observations that exist in the o¢ cial death registration data (this ranges from a maximum of 12 observations
for Massachusetts to 7 for Texas). This allows them to obtain extrapolated predictions for infant mortality
for each state between 1850 and 1920. They then combine these predictions with the Census data on infant
mortality between 1850 and 1920 for each state, and ￿nd the convex combination, for each census year, that
when aggegated (with appropriate population weights) across states best matches the national infant mortality
rate reported in the Historical Statistics of the United States. This procedure yields, for each state and year,
their estimate of infant mortality. For measures of mortality to age 10, they apply the same weights obtained
for infant mortality on the age-appropriate Census data and death registration extrapolations. See Murphy,
Simon, and Tamura (2008) for more details.
59See Preston and Haines (1991) for a thorough account.
32The ￿rst-stage regressions showing the relationship between the FERTILITY10 and child
mortality inclusive of state and year ￿xed-e⁄ects are given in table 6, columns 3-7. As
shown, child mortality enters negative and statistically signi￿cant throughout as does per
capita wealth and territorial status. In column 7, a decrease in child mortality by one
standard deviation (net of the variation due to state and year ￿xed e⁄ects) is associated with
an increase in FERTILITY10 of close to 0.1, which is almost 50% of the standard deviation
in this variable (likewise net of variation due to ￿xed e⁄ects). A one-standard-deviation
increase in per-capita wealth is associated with a decrease in FERTILITY10 of about .09.
Belonging to a territory or having a community property law system relative to common law
system also decreases FERTILITY10 by 0.15 and 0.24 children per women respectively. The
variable CITY measures the percentage of the population in the state that lived in cities with
more than 100,000 inhabitants. A one-standard deviation increase in this variable (net of the
variation due to year and state ￿xed e⁄ects) is associated with a reduction in FERTILITY10 of
0.5. The relationship between child mortality and FERTILITY10 remains economically and
statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿cations.
Dependent variable = FERTILITY10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Method: OLS OLS IV (1st) IV (1st) IV (1st) IV (1st) IV (1st)
CHILD MORT. 0.416** -1.557** -1.079* -1.109** -1.319** -1.220** -1.083**
(2.68) (7.11) (2.48) (2.63) (3.20) (3.13) (2.82)
WEALTHpc -0.112** -0.129** -0.116** -0.113**
(4.67) (4.88) (4.24) (4.46)






CONSTANT 1.307** 2.224** 2.273** 2.270** 2.344** 2.307** 2.240**
(37.37) -23.97 (14.29) (14.76) (15.24) (15.67) (15.75)
Year dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 356 356 356 356
Adj. R
2 0.02 0.29 0.56 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.67
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust t statistics in parentheses.
Notes: CHILD. MORT. is the fraction of children who died prior to the age of 10;
columns 3-7 report first-stage regressions; see Tables 2 and 3 for additional notes.
Table 6 - Property Rights: IV Analysis
The results from the second stage of the IV procedure are shown in columns 1-5 of table 7.
In all speci￿cations, the e⁄ect of survival-fertility remains negative and statistically signi￿cant.
In the most complete speci￿cation shown in column 5, a one-standard-deviation decrease in
FERTILITY10 is associated with an increase in women￿ s rights of a bit over 36%. The presence
of a community legal system is associated with a decrease in the probability of reform of 53%.
It is not clear, however, why greater wealth is now associated with a (marginally signi￿cant)
decreased probability of women￿ s property rights.
33Dependent variable = BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method: IV (2nd) IV (2nd) IV (2nd) IV (2nd) IV (2nd)
FERTILITY10 -1.992* -1.946* -1.455* -1.629* -1.719*
(2.13) (2.17) (2.32) (2.41) (2.20) -0.173+
WEALTHpc -0.182+ -0.172+ -0.165+ -0.173+
(1.68) (1.88) (1.81) (1.70) -0.457**






CONSTANT 3.802* 3.693* 2.772* 3.092* 3.247*
(2.12) (2.16) (2.31) (2.40) (2.20)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 356 356
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
robust t statistics in parentheses. Notes: columns 1-5 report second-stage
regressions; see Tables 2 and 3 for additional notes.
Table 7 - Property Rights: IV Analysis
4.4 Robustness
In this section I examine the robustness of the basic results to the inclusion of additional
variables and alternative measures of some key variables.
Timing of Property Rights Reforms
Throughout the empirical analysis, the reform of property rights is said to have been
observed in decade 2 relative to decade 1 if it occurred after decade 1 but before decade 2.
An alternative is to assign to each decade all the events that occurred in a symmetric ten-
years interval around it, e.g. 1860 is assigned all observations of married women￿ s property
rights that occur between 1855-1864. This alternative timing strategy yields very similar
results. Column 1 of table 8 shows the result for the full speci￿cation including time and
state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects. The quantitative e⁄ect of survival-fertility is slightly higher with
this timing alternative as is the territorial e⁄ect. The community system is insigni￿cant given
the few observations with state/territory ￿xed e⁄ects. If the state/territory ￿xed e⁄ect is not
included, the coe¢ cient on the variable is quantitatively large and statistically signi￿cant in
both the Probit and the OLS.
Alternative Hypotheses and Controls
The degree of urbanization across states varied signi￿cantly over this time period. Urban-
ization was associated with both greater wealth, lower FERTILITY10, and at least for the ￿rst
34few decades of this time period, higher child mortality (see table A2). Higher urbanization
was also associated with lower welfare levels for married women since these women were more
likely to be isolated from extended families and widows were more likely not to be able to
support themselves.60 We can include a proxy for this variable, denoted CITY, that measures
the percentage of the population in the state that lived in cities with more than 100,000 in-
habitants. Including this variable in the regression analysis does not a⁄ect the main results
as shown in column 2 of table 8, though it lowers a bit the magnitude of FERTILITY10. The
degree of urbanization is positive and statistically signi￿cant. A one-standard-deviation in-
crease in CITY (net of variation from ￿xed e⁄ects) is associated with an increased probability
of reform of 0.3%.61 This ￿nding may re￿ ect the theoretical prediction of the model that
places in which women were worse o⁄ would have earlier reforms or it may simply be that it
is easier to coordinate and plan reforms in states where people are more concentrated in large
urban areas.
OLS: dependent variable = BOTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FERTILITY10 -0.312** -0.260* -0.282* -0.293* -0.276*













WEALTHpc -0.038 -0.014 -0.018 -0.001 -0.004 -0.012 -0.016
(1.21) (0.44) (0.53) (0.03) (0.13) (0.36) (0.47)
TERRITORY -0.388** -0.262* -0.283* -0.213+ -0.235* -0.251* -0.243*
(3.58) (2.37) (2.38) (1.70) (2.09) (2.14) (2.03)
COMMUNITY -0.128 -0.161 -0.210+ -0.139 -0.166 -0.187+ -0.217+
(1.17) (1.49) (1.81) (1.22) (1.56) (1.73) (1.95)
CONSTANT 0.533* 0.502+ 0.385 1.034** 0.641* 0.562+ 0.567+
(2.01) (1.76) (1.17) (6.07) (2.49) (1.91) (1.95)
Timing closest
date
standard standard standard standard standard standard
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 356 356 356 322 356 355 355 355
Adj. R
2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.65
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; robust t statistics in
parentheses. Notes: CHILDBORN is defined in the text; CITY is the percentage of the
population in the state that lived in cities with more than 100,000 habitants; MALE is the
percentage of white adults that are male; FERTNEW is the # of children between 10-19
divided by the number of women between 30-49; FSCHOOL is percentage of girls 5-19
years old that attend school (excluding slaves); MSCHOOL is percentage of boys 5-19
years old that attend school (excluding slaves); see Tables 2 and 3 for additional notes.
Table 8 - Robustness
60See Chused (1983).
61Recall, however, that when included in the IV regression, this variable only entered signi￿cantly in the
￿rst stage and did not have explanatory value in the second stage (see tables 6 and 7).
35An alternative hypothesis is that women obtained rights as their bargaining position in
society grew stronger. One variable that may a⁄ect women￿ s bargaining power is their
relative scarcity in society. In particular, it is often speculated that states in which females
were scarce might try to make themselves more attractive to women by altering the legal
system, particularly as pertaining to married women￿ s property rights. Thus, it may be of
interest to include a variable that measures the percentage of the population that is male.
Column 3 in Table 8 shows that introducing this variable, denoted MALE, and de￿ned as the
percentage of the white population between 20 and 59 that is male, does not a⁄ect the results
and that the variable is statistically insigni￿cant.
As an additional test of the women￿ s bargaining power hypothesis, it is also interesting to
note that if one believes that voting rights are a good indicator of the women￿ s bargaining
power, then the extremely low correlation (.038) between the reform of women￿ s property
rights and voting rights indicates that this factor is unlikely to have played a role.62
Alternative Fertility Variables
Although the theory calls for using surviving-fertility rather than average fertility as the
explanatory variable, we can nonetheless construct measures of average fertility by using
responses to the question of ￿children ever born￿included in the Census as of 1900.63 For
each cohort and state one can create a measure of fertility by calculating the average number
of children born to women belonging to a given age bracket in that state. I chose to do this,
whenever possible, for women between the ages of 38-42. Thus, for example, the fertility
of women born in between 1908 and 1912, labelled the 1910 cohort, is calculated using the
responses of women 38-42 years old in the 1950 census.
Unfortunately, the above strategy for calculating fertility isn￿ t always feasible for a number
of reasons. First, this question wasn￿ t asked prior to 1900. This implies that, for cohorts
born prior to 1860, one needs to use the cohort￿ s fertility numbers given by older women in
the 1900 census (e.g. the number for the 1850 cohort is calculated using women 48-52 in
the 1900 census). Although the cohort￿ s fertility would be the same whether measured in
the (non-existent) earlier census or in the 1900 census, the drawback to using 1900 is that
the sample will tend to be more a⁄ected by inter-state migration and by survival selection
(especially for the oldest cohorts). An additional complication is that both the 1920 and
1930 censuses omitted this question, a⁄ecting the feasibility of this strategy for the 1880 and
1890 cohorts. I obtain their average fertility by using older women from their cohorts (58-62
and 48-52 years old, respectively) in the 1940 Census. Throughout I restrict the sample to
white married women born in the US and only include a state at a point in time if there
are at least 10 individual observations with which to construct the fertility measure.64 A
cohort￿ s fertility is attached to a date two decades later, e.g., the variables for 1880 include
62Only ￿ve states allowed women to vote prior to the reform of property rights. To calculate the correla-
tion, the states that voted against women￿ s su⁄rage and were forced to allow women to vote when the 19th
ammendment was passed in 1920 were assigned 1930. Similar results are obtained if they are assigned the
year 1925.
63Women were asked to report all live births.
64The omitted category is Black and thus the sample contains women from other races but these constitute
around a half percent of the sample. Throughout I use person weights.
36the fertility of the cohort born in 1860. This variable is denoted CHILDBORN. Its correlation
with FERTILITY10 is 0.58. In order not to rely on observations of women above the age of
70 in the fertility measure (which would also be from the earliest decade and thus even more
tainted by survival bias), I start the analysis in 1860 (i.e., with the fertility of the cohort born
in 1840).
The results from using this alternative fertility measure are reported in column 4 of table 8.
As can be seen, the signi￿cance of this variable is lower than FERTILITY10 ￿the appropriate
variable according to the theory. A one-standard deviation decrease in CHILDBORN is
associated with an 8.7 percent increase in the probability of reform.
One can also use a survival-fertility measure with alternative age ranges. Column 5 shows
the result of constructing an alternative measure of survival-fertility, denoted FERTNEW, in
which the age range of women runs from 30 to 49 (rather than 20-39). The results obtained are
similar. A one standard deviation decrease in FERTNEW (net of variation from ￿xed e⁄ects)
is now associated with an 6% increase in the probability of reform although the presence of
community property law is no longer signi￿cant at conventional levels.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed a dynamic model to analyze how capital accumulation, fertility, and
the existence of legal traditions with di⁄erent consequences for women￿ s welfare, a⁄ect male
preferences towards married women￿ s property rights. The main intuition delivered by the
model is that wealth accumulation or falling fertility alters the relative bene￿ts of a patriarchal
system relative to one in which women have property rights. Under the patriarchal regime,
both factors improve the welfare of sons more than the welfare of daughters. At some critical
level of fertility or capital, the disparity in the welfare of daughters versus sons implies that
a father would be made better o⁄ sacri￿cing the consumption bene￿ts he obtains from being
sel￿sh with his wife in order to ensure that his sons-in-laws are forced to be generous towards
his daughters. This critical level comes sooner in regimes that are less bene￿cial to women
(e.g., those that follow English common law relative to community property law), as their
daughters fare less well there, exacerbating the need for reform.
The implications of the model were studied empirically using variation across US states in
the timing of reforms to their systems of property rights. A robust negative correlation was
demonstrated between survival-fertility and reform. The presence of a community property
law was also shown to lead to earlier reform than English common law. The non-monotonic
relationship between per-capita wealth and reform, however, was not present, leading to the
conclusion that heterogeneity and knowledge of the political-economy mechanism for aggre-
gating preferences may be critical.
It would be of interest to see whether the results of this analysis can be replicated for
other countries, particularly in the context of contemporary developing countries. It may
be possible to ￿nd natural variation in survival-fertility (e.g. in the ease of access to/cost of
contraception) and variation in local laws that allow more in depth examination of some of
the main predictions of the model. Exploring variation in the timing of political rights within
countries (e.g., across Swiss cantons), with an appropriately modi￿ed model, may also shed
37light on the evolution of women￿ s political rights.65
In general, it would be of interest to study more deeply the co-evolution of economic and
political rights and economic development.66 The relationship between the organization of
families (e.g., who gives consent in marriage, the existence of polygyny, the ease of divorce,
etc.), women￿ s rights, and economic outcomes also deserves to be explored, particularly if one
wants to answer the question of why women￿ s rights happened in the West.67
The model also hints at why women￿ s welfare may not have increased in line with economic
growth. In particular, some historians have speculated that women may have been better o⁄
when the economy was poorer than they were in the mid 19th century (both in the US and
in England).68 As shown in the theoretical analysis of male regime preferences and growth,
when the economy has low wealth, men do not have much to gain from patriarchy. It is
only as capital accumulation takes o⁄ that male preferences strongly favor patriarchy. This
preference is later reversed once the economy reaches a critical level of wealth.
The model suggests furthermore that there should be attempts at piecemeal reform before
granting women full property rights. This would happen once the economy￿ s wealth exceeded
b k (but was below k￿) since, as of that point, men would be in favor of decreasing somewhat
their own consumption in favor of their wives if that allowed them to also improve their
daughter￿ s position, though they would not favor granting women full property rights.
What are the lessons of this paper for countries in which women have yet to obtain full
property rights? The model and empirical work suggest that policies that reduce fertility may
also help improve women￿ s economic position. It should be noted, however, that whether this
conclusion still holds in the presence of technologies that not only allow fertility reduction but
also sex selection is unknown and thus any policy implications should be drawn cautiously.
65In this case, endogenously di⁄erent political preferences of men and women may come into play (see, e.g.,
Edlund and Pande (2002)).
66See Lagerlof (2009) for an interesting recent attempt to study the endogenous evolution of property rights
in land and people (slavery).
67See Edlund and Lagerlof (2006), Iyigun and Walsh (2007b) and Tertilt (2006) for interesting work in this
area. See Coontz (2005) for a history of marriage.
68See Shammas et al (1987). In England, dower rights for women shrank over time before the reform of
married women￿ s property rights.
386 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
To prove lemmas 1 and 2, I guess the following functional forms for the value functions:
V
NR
h (kh;e kh) = ah + bh log
￿







w (kw;e kw) = aw + bw log
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h (kh;e kh) = ￿ + ￿log
￿





w (kw;e kw) = ￿ + ￿log
￿
kw + e kw
￿
(34)
where fah;bh;aw;bw;d;￿;￿g is the set of parameters that will be solved for using the method
of undetermined coe¢ cients. Recall that k = kw + e kw and that to solve for the e¢ cient
equilibrium we impose e k0
h ￿ k0
w and e k0
w ￿ k0
h before optimizing. Substituting (31) and (32)
in the RHS of (3) and (4), and substituting (33) and (34) in the RHS of (16), one obtains
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Taking the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ch;cw;k0
h and k0







































39We are now set to use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients for the NR regime by sub-
stituting the optimal policies and the value functions in the RHS of (35) and (36), obtaining:



























































Following the same procedure for the ER regime yields:
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406.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics
OBS MEAN ST. DEV ST. DEV 1 ST. DEV 2 MIN MAX
BOTH 356 0.58 0.49 0 1
FERTILITY10 356 1.40 0.27 0.12 0.21 0.70 2.86
WEALTHpc 356 1.37 0.96 0.60 0.77 0.12 8.22
TERRITORY 356 0.10 0.29 0 1
COMMUNITY 356 0.16 0.37 0 1
EQUITY 356 0.27 0.44 0 1
CHILD MORT. 356 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.57
FSCHOOL 355 56.60 16.20 0.90 93.60
MSCHOOL 355 57.81 16.00 3.20 90.90
CITY 356 8.45 13.49 4.49 1.26 0.00 65.55
MALE 356 54.51 7.49 1.10 5.66 44.59 95.93
CHILDBORN 322 3.60 1.42 1.07 1.26 1.25 9.40
See text for variable definitions.
Notes: ST. DEV 1 is standard deviation net of variation due to year fixed effects. ST. DEV 2 is
standard deviation net of variation due to year and state fixed effects.
Table A2 - Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) BOTH 1
(2) FERTILITY10 -0.42 1
(3) WEALTHpc 0.45 -0.59 1
(4) TERRITORY -0.29 -0.04 -0.14 1
(5) COMMUNITY -0.27 -0.06 0.17 0.30 1
(6) EQUITY 0.10 -0.34 -0.03 -0.20 -0.27 1
(7) CHILD MORT. -0.46 0.14 -0.50 0.13 0.03 0.36 1
(8) FSCHOOL 0.44 -0.40 0.45 -0.28 -0.20 0.20 -0.39 1
(9) MSCHOOL 0.37 -0.32 0.35 -0.27 -0.25 0.23 -0.28 0.98 1
(10) CITY 0.34 -0.44 0.33 -0.20 -0.03 0.25 -0.07 0.18 0.17 1
(11) MALE -0.12 -0.28 0.26 0.46 0.41 -0.34 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 -0.22 1
(12) CHILDBORN -0.53 0.58 -0.61 0.29 0.04 -0.29 0.47 -0.59 -0.49 -0.40 0.08 1
See text for variable definitions.
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